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and Public Bail-out Policies
Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the eﬀect of government bail-out policies on
banks outside the safety net. We construct a measure of bail-out perceptions by
using rating information. From there, we construct the market shares of insured
competitor banks for any given bank, and analyze the impact of this variable on
banks’ risk-taking behavior, using a large sample of banks from OECD countries.
Our results suggest that government guarantees strongly increase the risk-taking of
competitor banks. In contrast, there is no evidence that public guarantees increase
the protected banks’ risk-taking, except for banks that have outright public owner-
ship. These results have important implications for the eﬀects of the recent wave of
bank bail-outs on banks’ risk-taking behavior.
JEL: G21, G28, L53.
Keywords: Government bail-out, implicit and explicit government guarantees,
banking competition, risk-taking.1 Introduction
It is a widely maintained hypothesis that public guarantees distort competition in the
banking sector. The reason is that publicly guaranteed banks are able to reﬁnance at
more favorable terms than other banks because the protected banks’ creditors expect to
be compensated by the state if their bank is in danger of becoming insolvent. This line of
arguments has, for example, been underlying the discussion at the European Commission
about state aids to German public banks in the form of public guarantees. As is well-
known, the Commission concluded that such guarantees were not compatible with the EC
Treaty, and hence have to be phased out since July 2005.
In a recent paper, Hakenes and Schnabel (2009) have shown that such competitive dis-
tortions may undermine ﬁnancial stability because they provoke higher risk-taking by the
protected banks’ competitors. The theoretical argument is straightforward: Lower reﬁ-
nancing costs induce the protected bank to behave more aggressively (for example, by
raising deposit rates or lowering loan rates). This increases competition and decreases
margins, and hence charter values, for the competitor banks, and pushes these banks
towards higher risk-taking.
While there is an extensive empirical literature examining the eﬀect of bail-out policies
on the risk-taking of protected banks, the eﬀect of bail-out policies on banks outside the
safety net has not – to our knowledge – been systematically examined. To ﬁll this gap,
this paper empirically investigates the relationship between banks’ risk-taking behavior
and the competitive distortions induced by public guarantees in the banking sector.
The deﬁnition of public guarantees employed in this paper is broad. It is not limited
to explicit guarantees and public ownership, but also considers implicit guarantees. By
1implicit guarantees we mean the market expectation that a bank is saved even if there
is no explicit government commitment to do so. This is important. Before the ﬁnancial
crisis, many countries have seen merger waves in their banking sectors, leading to high
concentration ratios and an increasing number of “too big to fail” banks. Ultimately,
this was reﬂected in the various rescue operations of private banks in most industrial-
ized countries in the wake of the current ﬁnancial crisis. As a consequence, most large
banks presumably currently beneﬁt from either explicit or implicit government guaran-
tees. Hence, this paper speaks to the potential consequences of the recent bail-out policies
around the world. The results presented in this paper suggest that if the bail-out policies
increased market expectations of bail-outs in the future, this may distort competition,
increase the risk-taking of all banks (whether protected or not), and ultimately may lead
to greater ﬁnancial instability in the future.
Implicit guarantees are inherently diﬃcult to measure. In our empirical analysis, we
make use of the fact that some of the big rating agencies publish ratings reﬂecting their
expectations of the probability of external support. On the basis of this information, we
construct a variable, called the market share of insured competitor banks (MSI), which
captures the degree of competitive distortions through explicit or implicit guarantees, and
we analyze the eﬀect of this variable on banks’ risk-taking.
Our regressions show that the presence of banks protected by government guarantees
signiﬁcantly increases the risk-taking of the competitor banks. This result is robust to a
number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations, including an instrumental variable model, in which we
are able to trace the eﬀect of MSI through competition to risk-taking. They are also
robust to using diﬀerent book measures of bank risk-taking, including problem loan ratios,
equity ratios, and liquidity ratios. In contrast, using the same set of measures for bank
2risk, there is no evidence that public guarantees increase the protected banks’ risk-taking,
except for banks with outright public ownership.
These results have important implications for crisis management. First, they suggest
that banks’ competitive conduct after the crisis may not be independent of government
intervention during the crisis. This eﬀect of government intervention operating through
competition may be more important than the eﬀect of government guarantees on the
protected banks themselves. Second, the distortion induced by government intervention
during the current crisis is not easily removed. Even if governments divest their bank
ownership swiftly in the next few years, implicit guarantees may persist, as private sector
participants may have revised their expectations of future government intervention based
on the events during the crisis.
The paper proceeds as follows. We start by developing our major hypotheses in Section 2.
In the following section, we present the empirical model and describe the construction of
the major variables used in the empirical analysis, as well as data sources. Section 4
contains the empirical results from the baseline regressions. In Section 5, we present the
results from an instrumental variable model that takes the simultaneity of banks’ risk-
taking and interest margins into account. Section 6 presents estimations based on a more
ﬂexible speciﬁcation of bail-out probabilities. Section 7 analyzes the distinction between
private and public ownership of banks. Section 8 concludes.
2 Bail-out guarantees and risk-shifting
Economists have long been concerned about the eﬀects of explicit or implicit government
bail-out guarantees on the protected banks’ risk-taking. In theory, government bail-out
3guarantees can aﬀect the risk-taking of protected banks through two channels:
1. Market discipline: Public guarantees reduce market discipline because creditors
anticipate their bank’s bail-out and therefore have lower incentives to monitor the bank’s
risk-taking or to demand risk premia for higher observed risk-taking (Flannery, 1998,
Sironi, 2003, Gropp et al., 2006). This tends to increase the protected banks’ risk-taking.
The eﬀect is similar to that discussed in the deposit insurance literature (Merton 1977).
If depositors are protected by a guarantee, they will punish their bank less for risk-taking,
reducing market discipline.
2. Charter values: Public guarantees also aﬀect banks’ risk-taking behavior through
their eﬀect on banks’ margins and charter values. Keeley (1990) was the ﬁrst to show that
higher charter values decrease the incentives for excessive risk-taking, because the threat
of losing future rents acts as a deterrent to risk-taking. Government bail-out guarantees
result in higher charter values for protected banks due to lower reﬁnancing costs. This
tends to reduce the protected banks’ risk-taking.
Hence, as argued by Cordella and Yeyati (2003) and by Hakenes and Schnabel (2009), the
net eﬀect of public bail-out guarantees on the risk-taking of protected banks is ambiguous
and depends on the relative weight of the two channels. In a stylized model, we illustrate
this point in Appendix A1 (see Result 1). Most of the literature has focused entirely on
the ﬁrst eﬀect, whereas the second (countervailing) channel has largely been ignored in
the context of government guarantees. We would expect higher risk-taking only if the
market discipline eﬀect dominates the charter value eﬀect.
However, the presence of government guarantees may not only aﬀect the risk-taking of
4protected banks, but also – through competition – that of the protected banks’ com-
petitors. In fact, public guarantees reduce the margins and charter values of competitor
banks due to ﬁercer competition from banks that are able to reﬁnance at subsidized
rates (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2009). This pushes competitors towards higher risk-taking.
Therefore, we would expect public guarantees to unambiguously increase the risk-taking
of the competitor banks. This is the content of Result 2 in Appendix A1.
The empirical literature has again focused almost entirely on the eﬀect of government guar-
antees on the protected banks’ risk-taking. Most empirical papers come to the conclusion
that banks increase their risk-taking in the presence of public guarantees. For example,
Hovakimian and Kane (2000) have found evidence for higher risk-taking of banks in the
presence of deposit insurance. In contrast, Gropp and Vesala (2004) ﬁnd that explicit
deposit insurance reduces banks’ risk-taking. They argue that explicit deposit insurance
may mitigate moral hazard because it may serve as a commitment device to limit the
safety net. Hence, their evidence points towards a risk-increasing eﬀect of implicit de-
posit insurance. Relatedly, large banks – which may be perceived to be “too big to fail” –
have been shown to follow riskier strategies than smaller banks (Boyd and Runkle 1993,
Boyd and Gertler 1994, Schnabel 2004, 2009). The ﬁndings on the relationship between
bank size and failure probabilities are mixed, but the more recent papers point towards
higher failure probabilities at larger banks (Boyd and Runkle 1993, De Nicol´ o 2001, De
Nicol´ o et al. 2004). In contrast, there is no conclusive evidence that public banks follow
riskier strategies than private banks (De Nicol` o and Loukoianova, 2007).
The eﬀect of public bail-out guarantees on competitor banks has to our knowledge not
yet been analyzed. The only related ﬁndings are by De Nicol´ o (2001) and De Nicol´ o
and Loukoianova (2007) who ﬁnd that banks in countries with a higher market share
5or concentration of government banks exhibit higher insolvency risk. This would be
consistent with the theoretical predictions in Hakenes and Schnabel (2009).
The results on the overall eﬀect of public bail-out guarantees on systemic stability are
mixed. Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) present evidence for a negative eﬀect of
deposit insurance on banking stability, pointing towards a destabilizing eﬀect of guar-
antees. Similarly, some papers ﬁnd a negative relationship between bank stability and
government ownership (Caprio and Martinez 2000) or bank concentration (De Nicol´ oe t
al. 2004). However, there also exist papers that are consistent with no or even a stabiliz-
ing eﬀect of government guarantees. Barth et al. (2004) show that government ownership
has no robust impact on bank fragility, once one controls for banking regulation and su-
pervisory practices. Beck et al. (2006) ﬁnd that systemic banking crises are less likely in
countries with more concentrated banking sectors. These papers are diﬃcult to reconcile
with the evidence pointing towards a risk increase at protected banks. In contrast, they
are compatible with the idea that the charter value eﬀect dominates for protected banks.
Our paper will try to shed new light on these issues. Our main focus will be on the
hypothesis that the protection of banks should result in higher risk-taking at the competi-
tor banks, controlling for the bail-out probability of each individual bank. In addition,
we will analyze whether bail-out guarantees increase or decrease the risk-taking of pro-




In the empirical analysis, we explain banks’ risk-taking as a function of bank-speciﬁc and
country-speciﬁc characteristics. The empirical speciﬁcation is based on the theoretical
literature on the eﬀects of bail-out guarantees on bank risk-taking. Since the anticipation
of a bail-out aﬀects monitoring incentives, risk premia, and charter values (see Cordella
and Yeyati, 2003, and Hakenes and Schnabel, 2009), risk-taking is expected to depend
on the degree of protection of the bank itself. In addition, Hakenes and Schnabel (2009)
have argued for a competitive eﬀects of public guarantees, motivating the inclusion of a
measure of the protection of the bank’s competitors. Both eﬀects are illustrated in the
stylized theoretical model in Appendix A1.
To avoid contaminating eﬀects, we control for other important determinants of bank risk-
taking suggested by the theoretical and empirical literature, such as size (as a measure
of diversiﬁcation, see for example Demsetz and Strahan, 1997), the intensity of bank
competition (Keeley, 1990, Allen and Gale, 2004), deposit insurance (Merton, 1977, Kane,
1989), the procyclicality of risk-taking (Borio et. al, 2001), and transparency (Rosengren,
1999, Hyytinen and Takalo, 2002).
Hence, we model the risk-taking of bank i in country j as a function of the bank’s own bail-
out probability, pij, a measure of the distortion of competition caused by the protection of
competitor banks (which we name the market share of insured competitor banks, MSI−i,j),
as well as some control variables, Xij:
Riskij = α0 + α1 · pij + α2 · MSI−i,j + α3 · Xij +  ij (1)
7The construction of all variables is explained in detail below. Our main hypothesis is
that MSI increases banks’ risk-taking. Under that hypothesis, we would expect α2 to
be positive. Another coeﬃcient of interest is that of the bank’s own bail-out probability.
If the market discipline eﬀect dominates the charter value eﬀect, α1 is expected to be
positive; in the opposite case, it would be negative.
3.2 Data
Our major data source is Bureau van Dijk/IFCA’s BankScope database which contains
balance sheet and other bank-speciﬁc information for a large number of banks from a
large variety of countries. Our analysis is based on the cross-section of banks from all
OECD countries included in the BankScope database in the year 2003.1 We use the
banks’ unconsolidated statements if available. Hence, domestic and foreign subsidiaries
are included as separate entities. Regarding bank specialization, we include commercial
banks, cooperative banks, savings banks, real estate and mortgage banks, medium- and
long-term credit banks, as well as specialized governmental credit institutions. Other,
more specialized institutions, like investment banks and non-banking credit institutions,
are not included in our data set. The remaining data set includes more than 5,000 banks
from thirty countries.2 In the following, we will describe the construction of our major
variables of interest, as well as other control variables, and present descriptive statistics
of the data used in the analysis.
1Using a panel data set may increase eﬃciency, but does not help us in identiﬁcation, because the
time variation of the extent of public guarantees is very small.
2Further details on the preparation of the data set are contained in Appendix A2.
83.3 Public guarantees
The most diﬃcult and most important data issue is the measurement of public guarantees.
The goal is to construct a bank-speciﬁc bail-out probability, which we call pij.3 This
bail-out probability enters directly to measure the eﬀect of a public guarantee on the
protected bank’s risk-taking. Moreover, we want to construct a variable that measures
the competitive distortion due to the protection of competitor banks. This measure, which
we call the market share of insured competitor banks, is constructed (from the viewpoint








where Nj is the number of banks in country j, aij are the total assets of bank i in country
j,a n dAj =
Nj
i aij are total bank assets in country j. If all banks had either a bail-out
probability of zero or one, this variable would simply give us the market share of insured
competitor banks (hence the name of the variable). Note that the variable MSI does not
only vary across countries, but also across banks within countries, because the bank itself
is always excluded from the calculation.
Through a simple transformation, MSI can be written as the product of the competitors’









A−k,j is the competitors’ average bail-out probability, weighted
by market shares, and A−k,j = Aj − akj are the competitors’ total assets in country j.
3Note that this probability is the conditional probability of a bail-out, given that the bank runs into
problems.
9Hence, the higher the protected competitors’ average bail-out probability and the higher
the competitors’ total market share, the higher will be the competitive distortion.
The main challenge is the estimation of bail-out probabilities. We use two methodologies
to construct these bail-out probabilities. Depending on the procedure used, we call the
resulting variables p1o rp2, and MSI1o rMSI2, respectively.
Construction of MSI on the basis of support ratings (MSI1) The most straight-
forward procedure for calculating the market share of insured competitor banks is based
on the Support Ratings provided by the rating agency Fitch/IBCA. These ratings reﬂect
the rating agency’s expectations of the likelihood of external support to individual banks
(see Table 1 and Gropp et al. 2006 for a detailed description of such ratings). We assign
bail-out probabilities to Fitch/IBCA’s support ratings, based on the description of the
support ratings as given by Table 1.4
Publicly owned banks are assigned a bail-out probability of one. In addition, domestic
subsidiaries are assigned the bail-out probability of their mother company, whereas foreign
subsidiaries are treated as independent entities. Finally, all remaining private banks that
are not rated are assigned a bail-out probability of zero; the idea is that banks that are
not important enough to be rated are not important enough to be bailed out if they
fail. The bail-out probability calculated on the basis of this assignment is named p1,
the corresponding market share of insured competitor banks MSI1. The assignment of
bail-out probabilities is, of course, somewhat arbitrary. Therefore, we present several
alternative ways to estimate bail-out probabilities from the data.
4A similar procedure appeared to work well in Gropp et al. (2006).
10Table 1: Description of support ratings by Fitch/IBCA and assignment of bail-out prob-
abilities p1 for the construction of MSI1




A bank for which there is an extremely high probability of external support. The potential provider of support is 
very highly rated in its own right and has a very high propensity to support the bank in question. This probability
of support indicates a minimum Long-term rating floor of ‘A-’. 
1
2
A bank for which there is a high probability of external support. The potential provider of support is highly rated 
in its own right and has a high propensity to provide support to the bank in question. This probability of support 
indicates a minimum Long-term rating floor of ‘BBB-’.
0.9
3
A bank for which there is a moderate probability of support because of uncertainties about the ability or 
propensity of the potential provider of support to do so. This probability of support indicates a minimum Long-
term rating floor of ‘BB-‘.
0.5
4
A bank for which there is a limited probability of support because of significant uncertainties about the ability or 
propensity of any possible provider of support to do so. This probability of support indicates a minimum Long-
term rating floor of ‘B’.
0.25
5
A bank for which external support, although possible, cannot be relied upon. This may be due to a lack of 
propensity to provide support or to very weak financial ability to do so. This probability of support indicates a 
Long-term rating floor no higher than ‘B-’ and in many cases no floor at all. 
0
Construction of MSI on the basis of individual and issuer ratings (MSI2) In
addition to the Support Ratings, Fitch/IBCA also provides a rating that measures the
inherent strength of the bank, explicitly ignoring the likelihood of external support if
the bank experiences diﬃculties. This rating is called the Individual Rating. Finally,
the rating agency provides a standard Issuer Rating, which assesses the overall issuer
risk, taking into account any external support. The second version of MSI uses these
two ratings to construct the bail-out probability p2 and the market share MSI2. The
main idea is to utilize the information contained in the deviations of Issuer Ratings from
Individual Ratings to deduct the banks’ bail-out probabilities.5
For this purpose, we ﬁrst translate the two ratings into default probabilities. This is done
on the basis of standard rating transition matrices for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, from which we
5Consistent with our procedure, Rime (2006) shows that part of the diﬀerence between issuer and
individual ratings can be explained by a bank’s size, which he interprets as evidence for “too big to fail”
expectations.
11can calculate the historical default rates (Table 2).6
Table 2: Historical one-year ahead default probabilities for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms (in percent),
as used for construction of MSI2


















Notes: Data refer to the years 1994-2000. Source: Fitch/IBCA (2005), p. 7.
We then make use of the following relationship:
tdij = dij(1 − pij), (4)
where tdij is the total default probability (taking into account bail-outs) of bank i in
country j,a n ddij is the default probability in the absence of bail-outs. Hence, tdij corre-
sponds to the default probability as reﬂected in the issuer rating, whereas dij corresponds





unless the default probability dij is equal to zero (i.e., when the ratings are associated
with a zero historical default frequency, cf. Table 2). We therefore proceed as follows:
6It is important not to use the default probabilities of ﬁnancial ﬁrms, as these would themselves be
aﬀected by the safety net.
121. If dij > 0, we calculate the bail-out probability directly from the above formula.
Note that pij i se q u a lt o1i ftdij =0a n ddij > 0.
2. If dij = tdij = 0, we employ the information from the support ratings (using the
same assignment as in Table 1) to determine bail-out probabilities.
3. As before, domestic subsidiaries are assigned the mother company’s bail-out prob-
ability.
4. All publicly owned banks are assigned a bail-out probability of one.
5. Finally, all remaining private banks that are not rated are again assigned a bail-out
probability of zero.
In section 6, we also present the results from a third approach that avoids assigning
bail-out probabilities altogether.
3.4 Risk measures
As dependent variables we use the following broad set of variables found in the literature
to capture diﬀerent aspects of risk in banking:7 (i) Problem loans ratio, deﬁned as problem
loans over total assets (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992 and many others since then); (ii) Problem
loans ratio 2004, which is the one period ahead value of the problem loans ratio to account
for the backward-looking nature of problem loans; (iii) risk asset ratio, deﬁned as risk
assets (i.e. assets with non-negligible credit and market risk) over total assets (Furlong,
7All variables are calculated from the Bankscope data and have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles.
131988); (iv) liquidity ratio, deﬁned as liquid assets over short-term liabilities; (v) equity
ratio, deﬁned as book capital over total assets as a measure of leverage risk.8
All of these variables are calculated from balance-sheet data. In spite of the well-known
shortcomings of balance sheet data, their use is preferable here because the use of market
data would severely constrain our sample size. In particular, we would lose many of the
smaller banks.
3.5 Control variables
We use a standard set of bank-speciﬁc and country-speciﬁc control variables:9
Total assets (in logarithmic form) are used to measure a bank’s market power, returns to
scale, and diversiﬁcation beneﬁts. The inclusion of this variable is particularly important
because it allows us to distinguish between the risk eﬀects of diversiﬁcation and those of
expected bail-outs. Moreover, in part of the regressions, we control for diﬀerent types of
business (such as commercial banks, savings banks, etc.) by inserting dummy variables
for bank types.
At the country level, we use the Herﬁndahl index (the sum of squared market shares,
according to banks’ total assets) to measure the concentration in a country’s banking
sector. In theory, a higher concentration should increase intermediation margins and
thereby decrease risk-taking (see, e.g., Keeley 1990). We also control for the generosity of
the deposit insurance system, as measured by country-speciﬁc coverage limits (see Table
8We also tried the regulatory capital ratio, deﬁned as regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets
according to Basel I, as a risk measure. However, this variable proved to be insigniﬁcant in all of our
regressions. We attribute this ﬁnding to the risk insensitivity of Basel I and the ample opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage it provides. Indeed, this was the main motivation for introducing Basel II.
9See Table A1 in the Appendix for a detailed description of data sources.
14A1 in the Appendix for details). Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) ﬁnd that deposit
insurance increases the likelihood of banking crises, which suggests a risk-increasing eﬀect
of deposit insurance. In contrast, Gropp and Vesala (2004) argue that explicit deposit
insurance reduces banks’ risk-taking.
Risk-shifting should be more diﬃcult if there are stricter information disclosure require-
ments. Therefore, we control for the transparency of the banking sector (see again Table
A1 in the Appendix for details). Finally, we control for business cycle eﬀects by including
the deviation from trend of real GDP growth, and for ﬁnancial development by including
GDP per capita. In some regressions, we also include country ﬁxed eﬀects.
3.6 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics at the bank level. Note that the MSI variables
vary not only across countries, but also across banks within a given country because the
bank itself is excluded from the calculation of MSI. In our data set, the average bail-
out probability p1 (corresponding to MSI1) is 0.20 and the average p2 (corresponding
to MSI2) is 0.21. These relatively low numbers reﬂect the fact that there are a large
number of small banks with relatively low bail-out probabilities. The average MSI1a n d
MSI2 are both equal to 0.61, showing that the average protection of competitor banks
is substantial.
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics at the country level. Most importantly, the
table displays the measures MSI1country and MSI2country for the thirty countries in
our data set.10 These variables are based on MSI1a n dMSI2; however, they include
10Note that the variables used in the regressions are MSI1a n dMSI2, and not the variables calculated
at the country level. The variable MSI1country and MSI2country are shown to demonstrate country
diﬀerences in government protection.
15Variable N Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
Problem loans ratio (in %)* 2314 2.82 3.02 0.00 13.58
Problem loans ratio 2004 (in %)* 2004 2.76 3.08 0.00 14.84
Risk assets ratio (in %)* 5400 75.45 19.79 7.69 99.23
Liquidity ratio (in %)* 5352 34.46 43.76 0.80 322.73
Equity ratio (in %)* 5393 9.27 9.27 1.12 65.82
Bail-out probability (p1) 5443 0.20 0.38 0.00 1.00
MSI1 5443 0.61 0.18 0.00 0.87
Bail-out probability (p2) 5443 0.21 0.39 0.00 1.00
MSI2 5443 0.61 0.19 0.00 0.87
Total assets (in Thousands USD) 5443 1.07E+07 5.34E+07 2.27E+03 1.11E+09
Net interest margin* 5293 0.027 0.013 0.001 0.085
Table 3: Descriptive statistics at the bank level
See Appendix A2 and Table A1 for details on the compilation of the data set, and for data sources and 
definitions of all variables. Variables marked by * have been winsorized at the 1 and 99% level.
all banks in a given country, so that they are constant within countries. A high value
of MSIcountry can derive from two sources: from a high share of publicly owned banks
(Public share, see column 9 in Table 4), i.e., from explicit government guarantees, or from
a high share of banks that are likely to be bailed out for other reasons (most importantly,
large banks), i.e., from implicit government guarantees (corresponding to the diﬀerence
between MSIcountry and Public share). In the United Kingdom, for example, almost
two thirds of the banking sector are likely to be bailed out even though there are no
public banks. In contrast, the high value of MSIcountry in Germany is to a large extent
driven by the high share of publicly owned banks. The variation of MSIcountry is quite
large across countries: The lowest value (0%) is found in New Zealand, the highest in
Finland (87%); the latter value is largely driven by the dominant position of Nordea in
Finland, consistent with Finland’s high Herﬁndahl index (column 10). We also report the
within-country standard deviation of MSI1country and MSI2country (columns 5 and 8
in Table 4). As expected, the within-country standard deviations of MSI1country and
MSI2country vary strongly with the concentration of the banking system. For example,
16the U.S., Germany, and Italy, all countries with low concentration, exhibit low within-
country variation of both MSIcountry measures. In contrast, in Finland, Portugal, or
Greece, all countries with concentrated banking systems, there is a much higher within-
country variation of MSIcountry. The within-country variation of MSIcountry is also
determined by the homogeneity of bail-out probabilities within a country. An extreme
example is New Zealand, where all banks have a bail-out probability of zero, which implies
no within-country variation of MSIcountry.
Finally, in columns 4 and 7 of the table, we report the country ranks for MSIcountry1
and MSIcountry2. While the ranks of countries are broadly similar across the two
measures, there are important diﬀerences (e.g. Belgium, Greece, Hungary, Italy, South































Australia 44 81% 6 4.7% 80% 4 4.7% 9% 13.7 21,204           4.2% 0 12
Austria 183 31% 28 1.5% 29% 29 1.4% 8% 9.5 25,649           1.0% 1 8
Belgium 66 68% 10 2.9% 33% 27 5.1% 0% 23.0 24,431           1.6% 1 9
Canada 43 78% 7 4.8% 78% 5 4.8% 1% 13.9 23,511           3.3% 2 11
Czech Republic 22 59% 13 6.7% 63% 11 6.6% 6% 16.5 7,379             1.6% 1 9
Denmark 95 58% 14 4.2% 58% 14 4.2% 0% 22.6 32,421           0.5% 2 7
Finland 10 87% 1 16.2% 87% 1 16.2% 10% 38.5 26,098           2.3% 1 10
France 287 65% 11 1.4% 64% 9 1.5% 4% 6.9 24,472           1.2% 2 8
Germany 1486 77% 8 0.4% 83% 3 0.4% 51% 2.6 24,531           0.1% 3 11
Greece 20 72% 9 6.5% 57% 15 7.3% 37% 15.0 12,265           3.9% 1 10
Hungary 28 52% 19 2.7% 34% 26 4.0% 19% 9.1 6,574             3.8% 1 9
Iceland 28 54% 18 7.5% 57% 16 7.1% 29% 24.9 30,524           -1.3% 1 8
Ireland 38 40% 25 2.9% 40% 22 2.9% 4% 13.9 31,228           6.1% 1 11
Italy 695 55% 17 0.6% 67% 8 0.5% 3% 2.6 21,134           0.3% 3 12
Japan 628 57% 16 0.5% 44% 20 0.6% 12% 3.2 30,674           0.1% 2 11
Luxembourg 87 38% 27 1.4% 38% 25 1.4% 24% 4.4 50,579           3.6% 1 11
Mexico 39 52% 20 3.1% 41% 21 3.7% 23% 10.8 6,313             0.7% 3 12
Netherlands 44 81% 5 7.8% 86% 2 7.3% 9% 30.0 27,339           0.1% 1 10
New Zealand 9 0% 30 0.0% 0% 30 0.0% 0% 17.7 15,556           4.4% 0 12
Norway 53 38% 26 3.2% 39% 23 3.2% 26% 15.4 42,092           1.2% 3 11
Poland 37 52% 21 3.8% 57% 17 3.8% 25% 9.3 5,130             1.4% 1 11
Portugal 23 46% 24 6.1% 52% 18 6.0% 27% 16.3 12,382           0.8% 1 10
Slovakia 19 48% 23 5.3% 38% 24 5.4% 2% 14.3 4,555             4.2% 1 8
South Korea 19 83% 3 4.7% 60% 12 5.3% 39% 10.0 11,595           7.0% 2 11
Spain 144 57% 15 1.9% 64% 10 1.8% 0% 6.5 16,546           2.7% 1 11
Sweden 113 84% 2 2.8% 74% 6 2.8% 8% 11.5 27,360           2.0% 1 10
Switzerland 375 83% 4 2.7% 71% 7 2.8% 18% 29.4 38,437           0.4% 1 10
Turkey 32 50% 22 3.9% 47% 19 3.7% 36% 9.9 2,631             7.8% 3 9
United Kingdom 201 65% 12 1.5% 59% 13 1.5% 0% 6.3 26,650           1.8% 1 12
USA 575 28% 29 0.4% 30% 28 0.4% 0% 3.3 36,124           1.6% 3 11
The columns MSI1 (country) and MSI2 (country) give the overall values for each country. The MSI variables used in the regressions differ from the aggregate variables in that they do not include the
respective bank itself. See Appendix A2 and Table A1 for details on the compilation of the data set, and for data sources and definitions of all variables. See the text for the definitions of MSI1 and MSI2.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics at the country level
174 Estimation results
Table 5 presents the regression results from our basic speciﬁcation using MSI1a n dp1.
The columns refer to the diﬀerent measures of banks’ risk-taking. Table 6 adds ﬁxed
eﬀects for bank types.
The regression results in Tables 5 and 6 convey that a higher market share of insured
competitor banks signiﬁcantly increases banks’ risk-taking for all risk variables. The co-
eﬃcients are also economically signiﬁcant: For example, an increase in MSI1 by 0.1 (for
example, from 30% to 40%) increases the share of problem loans in total assets by 0.56
percentage points according to Table 5, which is substantial given a mean of 2.82 percent
(see Table 3). The eﬀect of the same increase of MSI1 on the equity ratio would be a
decrease of 1.1 percentage points, which is again quite large.
Another interesting result concerns the eﬀect of a bank’s own bail-out probability on risk-
taking. We ﬁnd that the own bail-out probability is either insigniﬁcant, or that it has a
signiﬁcant risk-decreasing eﬀect on banks’ risk-taking. This contradicts the conventional
wisdom according to which a higher probability of a bail-out increases banks’ risk-taking.
However, it is consistent with theory if the charter value eﬀect dominates the market
discipline eﬀect.
The remaining coeﬃcients are largely as expected. Larger banks (as measured by the
log of total assets) tend to have a lower share of problem loans (probably due to a bet-
ter diversiﬁcation of risks), a higher share of risk assets (due to diﬀerences in business
strategies), lower liquidity (again due to better diversiﬁcation), and lower equity ratios.
Banks in countries with a higher GDP per capita (indicating a higher sophistication of the






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20and a lower equity ratio. Business cycle upturns go along with fewer problem loans and
higher equity ratios, but have no eﬀects on liquidity.
The results on the eﬀects of deposit insurance and concentration in the banking sector
are somewhat mixed. A higher coverage of deposit insurance tends to increase risk-taking
for some variables (such as the risk assets ratio and the liquidity ratio), while it reduces
problem loans. A higher Herﬁndahl index decreases the problem loans ratio and increases
the equity ratio; in contrast, it increases the risk assets ratio. Transparency is mostly
insigniﬁcant.11
We also ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the risk measures depending on bank types (Table 6).
The omitted category is commercial banks. Relative to commercial banks, cooperative
banks consistently take on more risk. Savings banks have less capital and liquidity com-
pared to commercial banks, but also fewer problem loans. Mortgage banks hold more
risk assets and have lower capital levels, but they also hold more liquidity and have
fewer problem loans. And specialized governmental credit institutions have much more
problem loans than commercial banks. Given that the protection through government
guarantees and banks’ types are not related one-to-one (e.g., savings banks are public in
some countries, such as Germany, and private in others), the bank type dummies help us
to distinguish the eﬀects of bail-out guarantees from the eﬀects of diﬀerences in business
models and political lending (Sapienza, 2004).
Tables 7 and 8 present the same regressions, using MSI2a n dp2. The results are very
similar to those presented in Tables 5 and 6. MSI2 signiﬁcantly increases risk-taking in
11It has a signiﬁcantly positive impact only on the problem loans ratio of 2004 and on the equity ratio.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding is probably driven by the fact that banks in transparent banking systems are obliged to









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23most regressions. Again, the own bail-out probability is either insigniﬁcant, or it has a
risk-decreasing eﬀect.
We checked the robustness of our results by adding country ﬁxed eﬀects to our regressions
to make sure that the eﬀects are not driven by unobserved country eﬀects that are corre-
lated with the MSI variables. The results of these regressions are shown in Table 9. We
ﬁnd that the precision of the estimates generally decreases, as expected. Nevertheless,
MSI remains signiﬁcantly positively related to higher risk in many cases, and retains
the expected sign for all measures. The results referring to the own bail-out probability
are also similar to those not including country dummies. These results are remarkable
because these regressions “throw away” the between-country variation of MSI,i m p l y -
ing that only the within-country variation is used to identify the coeﬃcient of the MSI
variable. Nevertheless, the main result appears to be robust.12
5 Instrumental variable approach
The baseline results are striking and consistent with the theoretical considerations. How-
ever, they are mute about the channels through which MSI aﬀects banks’ risk-taking. In
theory, the eﬀect of bail-out guarantees on banks’ risk-taking works through banks’ in-
terest margins (see Appendix A1). Due to the bail-out guarantee, insured banks expand,
which compresses the margins of competitor banks. In reaction to increased competitive
pressures, banks increase their risk-taking to maintain proﬁtability. Higher risk-taking
feeds back positively into margins. Therefore, risk-taking should depend negatively on
the bank’s margin, and margins should depend positively on risk-taking. This implies
12Note that these results are driven by countries with large within-country variation in MSI, such as












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25that one cannot simply include banks’ margins as a control variable in the regressions.
Instead, we consider the following simultaneous equations model:
Riskij = α0 + α1 · Marginij + α2 · Xij + uij, (6)
Marginij = β0 + β1 · Riskij + β2 · Xij + β3 · Zij + vij. (7)
Here, X is a vector of exogenous variables that enter both equations. Z is an instrument
for interest margins, which is assumed to be orthogonal to the error term in the risk
equation. We use MSI as an instrument. The key identifying assumption is that MSI
aﬀects banks’ risk-taking only through the margin. This assumption is highly plausible.
The only reason why the protection of competitors may aﬀect risk-taking is competitive
eﬀects, which would show up in lower margins. Moreover, for the instrument to be
relevant, MSI has to be correlated with the margin, which can be checked empirically.
Using MSI as an instrument, equation (6) is just identiﬁed. Hence, a two-stage least
squares regression can be used to estimate the structural eﬀect of a bank’s margin on
its risk-taking. However, in the absence of an instrument for Risk, we cannot identify
equation (7). As the identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of risk on margins is not the primary
concern of this paper, we make no attempt in this direction.
Table 10 displays the results from the instrumental variables regressions. As a measure of
margins we use eﬀective interest margins, i.e. the bank’s net interest revenue divided by
the volume of interest-bearing assets. The upper panel shows the results from the ﬁrst-
stage regressions. We ﬁnd that MSI has a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on banks’ margins:
The higher the market share of insured competitors, the lower are the banks’ margins.13
The t-statistics range from -18.5 to -7.2, suggesting that the instrument is not weak. The
13The diﬀering estimation results in the ﬁrst stages of the regressions derive only from the diﬀerent
sample sizes.
26MSI1 -0.0342*** (0.000) -0.0329*** (0.000) -0.0192*** (0.000) -0.0193*** (0.000) -0.0192*** (0.000)
Own bail-out probability 
(p1) 0.000582 (0.647) 0.000179 (0.886) -0.000198 (0.654) -0.000207 (0.641) -0.000178 (0.687)
Total assets (log) -0.00135*** (0.000) -0.00131*** (0.000) -0.00200*** (0.000) -0.00200*** (0.000) -0.00200*** (0.000)
Herfindahl index 0.000398*** (0.000) 0.000394*** (0.000) 0.000261*** (0.000) 0.000256*** (0.000) 0.000258*** (0.000)
Deposit insurance 0.00690*** (0.000) 0.00712*** (0.000) 0.00657*** (0.000) 0.00650*** (0.000) 0.00657*** (0.000)
GDP per capita 2002 -0.000423*** (0.000) -0.000385*** (0.000) -0.000433*** (0.000) -0.000431*** (0.000) -0.000432*** (0.000)
GDP growth 2002 
(deviation from trend) 0.112* (0.067) 0.0831 (0.189) 0.132*** (0.000) 0.128*** (0.000) 0.132*** (0.000)
Transparency
-0.00173*** (0.000) -0.00203*** (0.000) -0.00100*** (0.000) -0.00103*** (0.000) -0.00100*** (0.000)
Constant 0.0776*** (0.000) 0.0778*** (0.000) 0.0735*** (0.000) 0.0739*** (0.000) 0.0734*** (0.000)
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Panel B: Second stage
Net interest margin -159.8*** (0.000) -193.6*** (0.000) -355.5*** (0.000) 1167.0*** (0.000) 592.8*** (0.000)
Own bail-out probability 
(p1)
0.230 (0.568) 0.220 (0.616) 0.709 (0.398) 0.428 (0.843) 1.404*** (0.001)
Total assets (log) -0.261*** (0.000) -0.382*** (0.000) 0.328 (0.162) 1.622** (0.015) -0.459*** (0.000)
Herfindahl index -0.0490*** (0.001) -0.000880 (0.959) 0.573*** (0.000) -0.349** (0.015) 0.0427 (0.165)
Deposit insurance 0.396 (0.184) 1.211*** (0.000) 10.34*** (0.000) -16.43*** (0.000) -3.437*** (0.000)
GDP per capita 2002 -0.160*** (0.000) -0.187*** (0.000) 0.175*** (0.001) -0.342*** (0.005) 0.0931*** (0.000)
GDP growth 2002 
(deviation from trend)
-47.34*** (0.001) -60.38*** (0.000) 13.44 (0.783) -128.2 (0.261) 25.71 (0.293)
Transparency -0.170 (0.156) -0.226 (0.118) -0.809** (0.031) 2.091** (0.025) 0.868*** (0.000)






2298 1974 5293 5254
0.256







59.70*** 42.53*** 44.61*** 16.42***
Panel A: First stage. Dependent variable: Net interest margin
(5)
Problem loans ratio Problem loans ratio 2004 Risk assets ratio Liquidity ratio Equity ratio
(1) (3) (4)
Table 10. Instrumental variable model for MSI1
Instrumental variable model. Estimated using equations (6) and (7). Panel A reports the results for the first stage and panel B for the second stage. The
dependent variable in the first stage is the net interest margin. The dependent variables in the second stage are the same risk measures as before. Robust
standard errors throughout. P-values in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Sample sizes for the different risk
measures differ due to data availability. The sample consists of all commercial, savings, cooperative, real estate and mortgage banks, medium and long-term
credit banks and specialized government credit institutions from OECD countries for 2003 included in the BankScope databse. Unconsolidated balance sheets
used when available. MSI1 is the market share of insured competitor banks as defined in the text. Additional details on the compilation of the data set, as well as
the definitions of all independent and dependent variables and data sources are given in Appendix A2 and Table A1. 
(2)
27eﬀects are also quite large economically: Depending on the speciﬁcation, an increase in
MSI by 0.1 decreases the interest margin by between 0.19 and 0.34 percentage points
(the mean of the interest margin is 2.7 percent, see Table 3).
The lower panel shows the second-stage regressions. We ﬁnd that higher margins give rise
to less risk-taking. Again, all eﬀects are highly signiﬁcant. These results strongly support
the prediction of our model that the eﬀect of MSI on banks’ risk-taking runs through
the banks’ margins.14
6 A ﬂexible speciﬁcation of bail-out probabilities
As a further robustness check, we estimated a less parametric speciﬁcation that avoids
assigning bail-out probabilities altogether. In particular, the risk variables are regressed
on the market shares (in terms of assets) of competitor banks from the diﬀerent rating
categories and on dummy variables indicating that a bank belongs to a certain rating
category (plus the same control variables as above).
As shown in Appendix A3, the coeﬃcient of the market share of the most highly protected
bank group can be interpreted as the marginal eﬀect of an increase in MSI if one is willing
to assume that this bank group is bailed out with probability one.15 Public banks and
banks with the highest support rating are treated as one rating category (as before). The
banks from the lowest rating category (including the non-rated banks) are the omitted
14We also ran regressions adding dummy variables for bank types (see Table A2 in the Appendix).
These results are similar to those in Table 10. Only in one regression the interest margin becomes
marginally insigniﬁcant. We also reran all regressions using MSI2 instead of MSI1. The results are
virtually unchanged compared to Tables 10 and A2.
15If the bail-out probability were lower, the coeﬃcient could be interpreted as the minimum eﬀect that
an increase in MSI would have.
28category. The regressions do not include dummy variables for bank types. The regressions
including bank type dummies are found in Table A3 in the Appendix.
The results from these regressions further support our main result. The parameter of
interest can be found in the ﬁrst line of Table 11. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of the
market share of competitor banks that are most likely to be bailed out (public banks or
banks with a support rating of 1) has the expected sign for all measures of risk and is
signiﬁcant at the 1% level in three of the ﬁve regressions. An increase in the market share
of these banks increases a competitor bank’s risk-taking. The coeﬃcients are somewhat
smaller than before. Remember, however, that the true eﬀect may well be larger if the
bail-out probability of the most highly protected banks is lower than one.
7 Public vs. private bank ownership
As a last step, we check whether there is any distinction between the eﬀects of implicit and
explicit government guarantees. We therefore reran the main speciﬁcation from Table 5,
allowing for diﬀerential eﬀects of explicit and implicit government guarantees. For this
purpose, we decompose MSI into two variables capturing the market shares of private
or public insured competitors banks, respectively (named MSI private and MSI public).
In addition, we allow for diﬀerential eﬀects of own bail-out probabilities for private and
public banks. The results are reported in Table 12.
We ﬁnd that the protection of both public and private banks has an eﬀect on the risk-
taking of competitor banks. The eﬀect of an increase in the market share of public
competitor banks is somewhat larger (in absolute value) than that of an increase in the


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30for three out of ﬁve risk measures (t-tests are reported at the bottom of the table). Nev-
ertheless, the results suggest that both the market share of publicly owned competitor
banks and the market share of implicitly insured competitor banks matter for the risk-
taking of competitors. Regarding the own bail-out probability, we ﬁnd that public banks
tend to have signiﬁcantly more problem loans and risk assets, but also more equity.16 For
private banks, a bank’s own bail-out probability has a risk-decreasing eﬀect for all risk
variables (signiﬁcant at least at the 5 percent level). In fact, the own bail-out probability
increases risk more for public than for private banks for all risk measures, and this dif-
ference is always signiﬁcant (at the 1 percent level). For private banks, the charter value
eﬀect seems to dominate the market discipline eﬀect, while the converse is true for public
banks. One possible explanation for these results is that public banks are less concerned
about protecting their charter values than private banks. The lack of market discipline
then explains the high risk-taking observed at public banks. Overall, the competitive
eﬀects of implicit government guarantees and of outright public ownership on risk-taking
seem to be of similar economic magnitude, while the eﬀect of government guarantees on
the bank itself is diﬀerent for outright public ownership and for implicit guarantees for
private banks.
We then repeated the regressions from Table 11 using the full set of dummy variables and
market shares, separating public and private banks (see Table 13).17 In this speciﬁcation,
the market share of publicly owned competitor banks has a large eﬀect on risk-taking,
which is always signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The market share of private banks
with a support rating of 1 also has a signiﬁcant risk-increasing eﬀect on the variables
16Note that the interaction term Own bail-out probability public is equivalent to a dummy variable for
public banks, as the bail-out probability is always 1 for these banks.
17Table A4 in the Appendix contains the same regressions with bank type ﬁxed eﬀects. The results

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32measuring loan quality (current problems loans and problem loans one year ahead), but
not on the other variables. The diﬀerence between the eﬀect of the market share of public
competitor banks and the market share of private competitor banks with a support rating
of 1 is relatively large and signiﬁcant for four out of ﬁve risk measures. The eﬀect of a
bank’s own bail-out probability is as in the previous speciﬁcation. We ﬁnd that public
banks have higher problem loans and hold a higher share of risk assets than banks from
the lowest rating category, indicating higher risk-taking at these banks. The results go in
the opposite direction for highly rated private banks (sometimes signiﬁcantly).18
Overall, the results of this section suggest that ownership matters, especially for the
eﬀect of the own bail-out probability. For public banks, the market discipline eﬀect of
guarantees tends to dominate the charter value eﬀect, while for banks with a high implicit
probability of being bailed out, the overall eﬀect of implicit guarantees may even be a
decrease in protected banks’ risk-taking.
8 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the eﬀect of public bail-out guarantees on the risk-taking of banks
outside the safety net. To this end, we construct a variable measuring banks’ implicit
and explicit bail-out probabilities by using rating information that reﬂects the bail-out
expectations of market participants. We then construct the variable MSI (market share
of insured competitor banks), which is designed to capture the degree of competitive
distortions in the banking sectors of diﬀerent OECD countries due to implicit and explicit
government guarantees. We test whether this variable increases banks’ risk-taking, as
suggested by recent theoretical work.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34The regression results are striking: MSI signiﬁcantly increases banks’ risk-taking, and
the estimated increase in risk is substantial. In contrast, we ﬁnd no evidence for higher
risk-taking at the protected banks themselves, except for banks with outright public
ownership. The results prove to be robust to a number of modiﬁcations, including the
use of a large number of book risk measures and alternative ways of modelling bail-out
probabilities and MSI. We further show that the eﬀect of MSI indeed runs through the
banks’ margins. This supports the theoretical prediction that a higher protection of banks
reduces margins for competitor banks and pushes these banks towards higher risk-taking.
These results have important policy implications: First, they suggest that the eﬀect of
the government guarantees issued during the current ﬁnancial crisis may constitute a
threat to the stability of banking systems in the future. The channel is not moral hazard
at the protected banks, as is frequently argued, but rather competitive conduct. The
main costs of implicit or explicit government guarantees appear to consist in higher risk-
taking of competitor banks, rather than of the protected banks themselves. Moreover, the
focus on the distortionary eﬀect of explicit guarantees (especially to public banks) may be
overly narrow; even though such guarantees have been shown to cause a strong increase in
the competitor banks’ risk-taking, implicit guarantees also seem to cause distortions. The
paper suggests that the public disinvestment and the discontinuation of explicit guarantees
may be insuﬃcient to eliminate the distortionary eﬀect of these guarantees: As long as




Setting. In order to derive testable hypotheses, we present a stylized partial equilibrium
model in this section. This model is a boiled-down version of Hakenes and Schnabel
(2009). Consider a banking system that is characterized by competition for funds ` al a
Monti-Klein. Each single bank faces an upward-sloping supply curve for funding. The
gross funding rate (including principal) is R = R(l,L), where l is the bank’s demand for
funds and L is the bank’s competitors’ demand for funds. For the purpose of illustration,
consider a linear bank-individual supply function, R = R0+a1 l+a2 L with positive a1 and
a2. The bank invests into risky assets, such as loans. Assume that the bank’s portfolio
yields y with probability q(y), and zero otherwise (as in Allen and Gale, 2004). Banks are
subject to limited liability. As an example, consider a linear risk proﬁle, q(y)=q0 − by
with positive b and q0.19 A bank’s default probability is thus d =1− q(y). Assume for
simplicity that investors are not covered by deposit insurance. However, a bank is bailed
out by the state with probability p when the bank’s portfolio returns nothing. The total
default probability is then d(1 − p), as in (4). If a bank is fully protected (p =1 ) ,i t s
investors are always repaid, hence they do not care about the bank’s risk-taking. The
supply of funds if then given by R(l,L) as above. However, if the bank is less than
fully protected (p<1), investors demand a markup, and the risk-adjusted funding rate
becomes φR(l,L)w i t hφ =( 1− d(1 − p))−1 in case of risk neutral investors.20
19By assumption, q(y) does not depend on l and L, implying that a bank’s risk proﬁle is independent
of the loan volume. In reality, if a bank tried to expand its loan volume, it would have to lend to less
creditworthy borrowers, hence its portfolio would deteriorate. Then the eﬀect of government guarantees
may be even more harmful for competitor banks. In addition, protected banks may poach the best
customers from their competitors, leading to a further deterioration of the competitors’ loan portfolios.
We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this additional channel, which is ruled out in this model.
20For a detailed discussion of assumptions, see Hakenes and Schnabel (2009).
36The time structure is fairly standard: At date t = 0, a bank borrows funds l from investors.
Investors anticipate the bank’s risk choice y and set φ accordingly, depending on whether
the bank enjoys protection by the state or not. Then, the bank invests into the loan
portfolio and chooses y.S i n c ey is unobservable, the bank faces a moral hazard problem.
As is common in models with risk shifting, each bank takes excessive risks at the expense
of investors. At date t = 1, the portfolio yields y with probability q(y). If their portfolio
fails, banks repay only if they are bailed out.
Figure 1 shows the timing of the model.
Figure 1: Time Structure
• t0 A bank borrows funds l at rate φR(l,L). The markup φ is de-
termined by the bank’s bail-out probability p and by investors’
expectations about the bank’s risk choice y.
• The bank chooses y.
• t1 Projects mature and return y with probability q(y). The bank pays
φR(l,L) to its investors if possible. Otherwise, the government
repays investors with probability p.
Partial Equilibrium and Comparative Statics. Consider date t = 0 when the bank
determines its risk choice y and its funding volume l, which at the same is the volume of
its asset portfolio. The bank’s proﬁt function is
Π=lq(y)[y − φR(l,L)]
= l(q0 − by)[y − φ(R0 + a1 l + a2 L)]. (8)












=( q0 − by)

y − φ(R0 +2a1 l + a2 L)

=0 . (10)
37Solving (10) for y yields y = φ(R0 +2a1 l + a2 L). Substituting this expression into (9),
one obtains q0 − bφ(R0 +3a1 l + a2 L) = 0. Solving for l yields l∗, and substituting this

















+ φ(a2 L + R0)
	
. (11)
Our results now obtain immediately. The ﬁrst result concerns the eﬀect of public bail-out
guarantees on the protected bank’s risk-taking. Hence, it refers to the eﬀect of pij on
Riskij in equation (1).
Result 1 The relation between a bank’s protection p and its risk choice y is ambiguous.












+ φ(a2 L + R0)
	
=
a2 L + R0
3
. (12)
This expression can be positive or negative, implying that a higher markup (corresponding
to a lower bail-out probability) may result in a risk decrease or a risk increase. This can
be demonstrated in two ways. First, we have assumed that R(l,L)=R0 + a1 l + a2 L is
the bank-individual deposit supply function. In reality, the supply will not be linear, so
R(l,L) can be seen as an approximation in the relevant range. However, the intercept
of a linear approximation can be negative, even if the original function is always positive
(take the approximation of the function f(x)=1+x2 around x = 1 as an example). For



















bφ − (a2 L + R0)

=
3(R0 + a2 L)+
 q0
bφ − (a2 L + R0)

 q0
bφ − (a2 L + R0)
 =
q0 +2bφ(a2 L + R0)
q0 − bφ(a2 L + R0)
, (13)
38which exceeds 1 if and only if a2 L+R0 > 0. Hence, the reaction of a bank’s risk choice to
government protection (p) depends on whether its individual supply of funds is elastic or
not. Since the supply of funds can be elastic or inelastic in reality, the eﬀect of government
protection on a bank’s risk choice y is ambiguous.
The second result concerns the eﬀect of public bail-out guarantees on the competitor
banks’ risk-taking, i.e., the eﬀect of MSI−ij on Riskij in equation (1).
Result 2 A bank’s risk choice y depends positively on the protection of its competitors.
The argument is made in three steps. First, higher government protection induces pro-
tected banks to expand. Second, this leads to ﬁercer competition for the bank’s competitor
banks. Third, a competitor bank that faces stronger competition chooses higher risk.
For the ﬁrst argument, consider (11). Since the derivative of l∗ with respect to φ is
negative, a more highly protected bank (with lower φ,e . g .φ = 1) has a larger optimal
funding volume l∗. The expansion of protected banks implies that L increases, leading to


















implying that a bank takes more risk when competition intensiﬁes. Taken together, this
leads to the conclusion that a higher protection of some banks induces the competitor
banks to increase their risk.
A2. Compilation of data set
Our data set includes all banks from OECD countries contained in the BankScope database
in the year 2003. We use unconsolidated bank statements (Bankscope consolidation codes
39U1, U2) where such statements are available. U* statements were used only if no other
unconsolidated statements existed. If no unconsolidated statements were available, we
used consolidated statements (C1, C2, C*). Banks with a consolidation status of A1
were dropped.21 From the remaining banks, we dropped central banks, investment banks
and securities houses, multi-lateral governmental banks, as well as non-banking credit
institutions. We also dropped bank holdings and bank holding companies to avoid a
double-counting of banks. The total assets of all banks in each country in our data set are
similar to the data given by the OECD. For internal consistency, we prefer to use the data
constructed from our data set. The identiﬁcation of public ownership and subsidiaries is
done on the basis of the information on the ultimate owner contained in the BankScope
data set. The given information was complemented through an extensive internet search.
The data set is complemented by rating information from Fitch/IBCA (referring to the
end of 2002).
21The BankScope deﬁnitions of the diﬀerent types of bank statements are as follows. U1: a statement
not integrating the possible subsidiaries of the concerned bank, and there does not exist a consolidated
statement for the bank in the database. U2: a statement not integrating the possible subsidiaries of the
concerned bank, and there does exist a consolidated statement in the database. C1: a statement of a
mother company integrating the statements of its subsidiaries, and the unconsolidated statement for the
bank is not in the database. C2: a statement of a mother company integrating the statements of its
subsidiaries, and the unconsolidated statement for the bank is in the database. A1: a statement made
up of the addition of the individual statements of a group of aﬃliated banks. C* and U* represent other
consolidated or unconsolidated statements, respectively.
40A3. A ﬂexible speciﬁcation of bail-out probabilities
For simplicity, let us consider the case of just two support rating categories (represented
by the dummy variables D1i and D2i). We omit country indices and consider a model
without a constant term. We ignore further control variables and start from a simpliﬁed
version of equation (1).
Riski = α1 · pi + α2 · MSI−i +  i, where (15)
pi = p1 · D1i + p2 · D2i and (16)







The last equation implies that MSI is a weighted average of the bail-out probabilities
of banks from the two rating categories, weighted by the respective market shares (not
including the bank itself). Substitution yields













+  i. (19)
The δ-parameters can be estimated by a regression of Risk on the rating category dummy
variables plus the respective market shares. However, it is not possible to infer the pa-
rameters of interest, i.e., in particular α2, from the estimated coeﬃcients. Therefore, we
impose the restriction that the bail-out probability of the most highly protected bank
group is equal to one. Note that this restriction is much milder than assigning bail-out
probabilities to all rating categories.
We see directly that α2 is then equal to δ3. Hence, we can simply look at the coeﬃcient
of the market share of the highest rating category in order to infer the eﬀect of MSI on
banks’ risk-taking. An analogous argument can be made with respect to α1 and δ1.
41Note that in the actual estimation, we treat the lowest rating class (including the non-
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































43MSI1 -0.0296*** (0.000) -0.0285*** (0.000) -0.0163*** (0.000) -0.0164*** (0.000) -0.0163*** (0.000)
Own bail-out probability 
(p1)
0.000275 (0.844) -0.000243 (0.863) -0.00242*** (0.000) -0.00233*** (0.000) -0.00239*** (0.000)
Total assets (log) -0.00165*** (0.000) -0.00165*** (0.000) -0.00188*** (0.000) -0.00188*** (0.000) -0.00188*** (0.000)
Herfindahl index 0.000333*** (0.000) 0.000313*** (0.000) 0.000174*** (0.000) 0.000172*** (0.000) 0.000172*** (0.000)
Deposit insurance 0.00683*** (0.000) 0.00699*** (0.000) 0.00625*** (0.000) 0.00621*** (0.000) 0.00626*** (0.000)
GDP per capita 2002 -0.000390*** (0.000) -0.000344*** (0.000) -0.000465*** (0.000) -0.000463*** (0.000) -0.000464*** (0.000)
GDP growth 2002 
(deviation from trend)
0.0996 (0.109) 0.0735 (0.252) 0.131*** (0.000) 0.127*** (0.000) 0.131*** (0.000)
Transparency -0.00154*** (0.000) -0.00192*** (0.000) -0.000838*** (0.000) -0.000861*** (0.000) -0.000836*** (0.000)
Constant 0.0794*** (0.000) 0.0811*** (0.000) 0.0720*** (0.000) 0.0723*** (0.000) 0.0719*** (0.000)
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Panel B: Second stage
Net interest margin -138.7*** (0.000) -180.6*** (0.000) -187.2 (0.105) 941.7*** (0.001) 443.0*** (0.000)
Own bail-out probability 
(p1)
0.0527 (0.893) -0.213 (0.620) -4.438*** (0.000) 7.708*** (0.005) 1.470*** (0.006)
Total assets (log) -0.197*** (0.005) -0.351*** (0.000) 1.185*** (0.000) -0.892 (0.223) -1.167*** (0.000)
Herfindahl index -0.0209 (0.210) 0.0217 (0.261) 0.469*** (0.000) -0.267* (0.069) 0.0253 (0.387)
Deposit insurance 0.358 (0.262) 1.237*** (0.000) 8.579*** (0.000) -11.39*** (0.000) -1.871*** (0.000)
GDP per capita 2002 -0.143*** (0.000) -0.176*** (0.000) 0.129** (0.035) -0.186 (0.187) 0.0700*** (0.007)
GDP growth 2002 
(deviation from trend)
-49.43*** (0.000) -63.81*** (0.000) 25.02 (0.586) -141.6 (0.192) 29.34 (0.182)
Transparency -0.147 (0.208) -0.206 (0.158) -0.433 (0.224) 0.488 (0.592) 0.496*** (0.006)






2298 1974 5293 5254
0.279
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6)
48.70***
5286 2298 1974
50.46*** 36.26*** 99.29*** 56.34***
5293 5254
Equity ratio Risk assets ratio Liquidity ratio
Table A2. Instrumental variable model for MSI1 with bank type fixed effects
Instrumental variable model. Estimated using equations (6) and (7) with bank type dummies added (not reported). Panel A reports the results for the first stage
and panel B for the second stage. The dependent variable in the first stage is the net interest margin. The dependent variable in the second stage are the same
risk measures as before. Robust standard errors throughout. P-values in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sample sizes for the different risk measures differ due to data availability. The sample consists of all commercial, savings, cooperative, real estate and
mortgage banks, medium and long-term credit banks and specialized government credit institutions from OECD countries for 2003 included in the BankScope
database. Unconsolidated balance sheets used when available. MSI1 is the market share of insured competitor banks as defined in the text. Additional details
on the compilation of the data set, as well as the definitions of all independent and dependent variables and data sources are given in Appendix A2 and Table
A1.
(1) (2) (5) (3) (4)
Problem loans ratio Problem loans ratio 2004
0.279 0.277















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Allen, Franklin and Douglas Gale (2004): “Competition and Financial Stability,” Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 36(3) Pt. 2, 453-480.
Barth, James R., Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine (2004): “Bank Regulation and Super-
vision: What Works Best?,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13, 205–248.
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, and Ross Levine (2006): “Bank Concentration and
Crises: First Results,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 30, 1581-1603.
Borio, Claudio, Craig Furﬁne, and Philip Lowe (2001): “Procyclicality of the ﬁnancial
system and ﬁnancial stability: issues and policy options,” BIS Papers No. 1.
Boyd, John H. and Mark Gertler (1994): “The Role of Large Banks in the Recent U.S.
Banking Crisis,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 18(1), 2–21.
Boyd, John H. and David E. Runkle (1993): “Size and Performance of Banking Firms:
Testing the Predictions of Theory,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 31(1), 47–67.
Caprio, Gerard and Maria Soledad Martinez Peria (2000): “Avoiding Disaster: Policies
to Reduce the Risk of Banking Crises,” Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, Working
Paper, No. 47.
Cordella, Tito and Eduardo L. Yeyati (2003): “Bank Bailouts: Moral Hazard vs. Value
Eﬀect,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 12, 300–330.
Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, Asli and Enrica Detragiache (2002): “Does Deposit Insurance Increase
Banking System Stability? An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Monetary Economics,
49(7), 1373–1406.
47Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, Asli, Ed Kane, Baybars Karacaovali and Luc Laeven (2008): “Deposit
Insurance around the World: A Comprehensive Database” in: Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, Asli, Ed
Kane and Luc Laeven (eds): Deposit Insurance around the World: Issues of Design and
Implementation, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Demsetz, Rebecca S. and Philip E. Strahan (1997): “Diversiﬁcation, Size, and Risk at
Bank Holding Companies,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29(3), 300–313.
De Nicol´ o, Gianni (2001): “Size, Charter Value, and Risk in Banking: An International
Perspective,” in: The Financial Safety Net: Costs, Beneﬁts and Implications for Regu-
lation, Proceedings of the 37th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition,
Federal Reserve of Chicago, 197-215.
De Nicol´ o, Gianni, Philip Bartholomew, Jahanara Zaham, and Mary Zephirin (2004):
“Bank Consolidation, Conglomeration and Internationalization: Trends and Implications
for Financial Risk,” Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 13, 173-217.
De Nicol´ o, Gianni and Elena Loukoianova (2007): “Bank Ownership, Market Structure,
and Risk,” International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 07/215, Washington, D.C.
Fitch/IBCA (2005): “Fitch Ratings Global Corporate Finance 2004 Transition and De-
fault Study,” available at http://www.ﬁtchratings.com.
Flannery, M. (1998): “Using Market Information in Prudential Banking Supervision: A
Review of U.S. Evidence,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 30, 273-305.
Furlong, Frederick T. (1988): “Changes in Bank Risk-Taking,” Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco Economic Review, 2, 45-56.
48Gropp, Reint, and Jukka Vesala (2004): “Deposit insurance, moral hazard and market
monitoring,” Review of Finance, 8(4), 571-602.
Gropp, R., J. Vesala, and G. Vulpes (2006) “Equity and debt market signals as indicators
of bank fragility,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 38 (2), 399-428.
Hakenes, Hendrik and Isabel Schnabel (2009): “Banks without Parachutes – Competitive
Eﬀects of Government Bail-out Policies, ” Journal of Financial Stability, forthcoming.
Hovakimian, Armen and Edward J. Kane (2000): “Eﬀectiveness of Capital Regulation at
U.S. Commercial Banks, 1985-1994,” Journal of Finance, 55(1), 451–468.
Hyytinen, Ari and Tuomas Takalo (2002): “Enhancing Bank Transparency: A Re-assessment,”
European Finance Review, 6(3), 429–445.
Kane, Edward J. (1989): The S&L Insurance Mess: How did it Happen? Washington:
Urban Institute Press.
Keeley, Michael C. (1990): “Deposit Insurance, Risk and Market Power in Banking,”
American Economic Review, 80(5), 1183–1200.
Merton, Robert (1977): “An Analytical Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and
Loan Guarantees,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 1(1), 3–11.
OECD (2004): Bank Proﬁtability. Financial Statements of Banks 1994-2003. Edition
2004. Paris.
Rime, Bertrand (2006): “Do ‘too big to fail’ expectations boost large banks’ issuer rat-
ings?”, Unpublished Working Paper, Swiss National Bank.
Rosengren, Eric (1999): “Will greater disclosure and transparency prevent the next
banking crisis?”, in The Asian Financial Crisis: Origins, Implications and Solutions
49by William C. Hunter, George Kaufman, and Thomas Krueger (eds.), Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
Sapienza, Paola (2004): “The eﬀects of government ownership on bank lending,” Journal
of Financial Economics, 72, 357–384.
Schnabel, Isabel (2004): “The German Twin Crisis of 1931,” Journal of Economic History,
64(3), 822–871.
Schnabel, Isabel (2009): “The Role of Liquidity and Implicit Guarantees in the German
Twin Crisis of 1931,” Journal of International Money and Finance, 28, 1–25.
Shrieves, Ronald E. and Drew Dahl (1992): “The Relationship between Risk and Capital
in Commercial Banks,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 16, 439–457.
Sironi, A. (2003): “Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry:
Evidence from Subordinated Debt Issues,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35(3),
443–472.
50